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This paper examines how the incumbency advantage is related to ideological voting or
legislative shirking that causes the incumbents to diverge from the preference of the median
voter using aggregate data for the U.S. House of Representatives between 1948 and 2000. I
find that a rise in the incumbency advantage manifested in higher reelection rates increases
the ideological divergence or polarization the U.S. House of Representatives. I also find that
the average number of bills per congressman falls with greater ideological polarization.
These findings suggest that ideological and non-ideological shirking rise with the incumbent
reelection rate.
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When political markets work efficiently, voters punish shirking
1 politicians by voting them 
out of office. High incumbent reelection rates in the U.S. Congress may seem to support this 
claim. However, it can be argued that this evidence is also consistent with the claim that 
incumbents enjoy a significant advantage over challengers, which allows them to conduct 
some amount of political shirking without being voted out of office. The idea that incumbents 
may choose to trade some of their votes for a chance to enact their own ideological 
preferences is not new. For instance, Sobel (1992) argues that the idea of viewing politicians 
simply as vote maximizing agents is naive. He models politicians as rational vote maximizing 
agents who also pursue their own interests even if it leads to being voted out of office and 
concludes that incumbents should be willing to trade some of the extra votes in exchange for 
pursuing their own ideological preferences. This paper investigates Sobel’s (1992) claim 
empirically by analyzing the relationship between the incumbency advantage and political 
ideology.  
In this paper, I avoid using the controversial ideology residual approach. Instead, I 
estimate an endogenous model that links the incumbent reelection rate to the ideological 
divergence or polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. Berger et al. (2000) point 
out that voter risk aversion towards uncertainty can contribute to the incumbency advantage, 
which can be spent on legislative shirking. This idea serves as the motivation for the paper’s 
empirical section. Using aggregate level data and 2SLS-IV estimator, I find that a rise in the 
incumbent reelection rate leads to a significant increase in the ideological divergence or 
polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. If divergence from the median voter 
reflects legislative shirking, then my finding suggests that a rise in the incumbency advantage 
would increase shirking in the aggregate. I also find that the amount of introduced bills falls 
with greater ideological polarization, which could be interpreted as evidence of non-
ideological shirking taking place as well. By examining shirking at the aggregate instead of 
individual level, I uncover new evidence pertinent to the overall efficiency of political 
markets that Bender and Lott (1996) find lacking in the literature. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on political ideology and shirking is burgeoning with studies trying to answer 
the question of whether legislators shirk, but the evidence is still largely inconclusive. The 
canonical papers by Kau and Rubin (1979) and Kalt and Zupan (1984) argue that legislators 
often vote in a manner contrary to their constituents’ interests. The idea behind these studies 
is very simple. If the ideology residual derived from general voting patterns is a significant 
determinant of legislators’ voting behavior in addition to constituent characteristics, then one 
could argue that legislators deviate from the interests of their constituents (i.e. ideological 
voting or shirking exists). There have been many following studies testing this idea. For 
example, consider a study by Medoff et al. (1995) who find that Senate voting on the 1994 
Freedom of Abortion Access bill was highly related to the senator's personal ideology and not 
to constituent opinion or demographics.  
However, the Kalt and Zupan (1984) and similar studies have been challenged by the 
later findings of Lott and Bronars (1993), Lott and Davis (1992), and Vanbeek (1991) 
showing little or no evidence on legislator shirking using similar approaches. Moreover, 
Peltzmann (1984) argues that the ideology residual may be picking up omitted constituency 
variables. However, if legislators with higher victory margins or weaker electoral competition 
                                                 
1 Shirking is defined here as an ideological consumption activity driven by politician’s personal ideological 
preferences or some other factors that cause politician’s legislation to diverge from the preferences of the 
median voter as the cost of shirking (i.e. reduced probability of reelection) falls. Political or ideological shirking 
(voting) is used interchangeably in this paper. Legislative shirking, however, could also refer to ideological as 
well as non-ideological shirking.  
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shirk more, argues Figlio (2000), then Lott and Bronars’ (1993), Lott and Davis’ (1992), and 
Vanbeek’s (1991) findings understate the magnitude of the electoral response to shirking due 
to the endogenous nature of shirking. In fact, Figlio (2000) finds that a simultaneous 
modeling of electoral outcomes, shirking and opponent quality substantially increases the 
estimated relationship between shirking and electoral outcomes. Figlio (2000) also finds that 
voters tend to mind recent shirking more than shirking early in the senator’s term. Another 
paper by Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) avoids the pitfalls of prior studies by utilizing a 
quasi-experimental research design contrasting the behavior of incumbents seeking reelection 
and those departing the U.S. House of Representatives. They find that a departing incumbent 
will change his or her participation rate and ideological position substantially more than a 
continuing legislator. 
 
3. Empirical Model and Estimates 
The incumbency advantage can come from a variety of sources such as unequal access to 
campaign resources, information asymmetry, and voter risk aversion. A rise in the 
incumbency advantage would allow incumbents to shirk more or legislate closer to their own 
ideological preferences. Like Berger et al. (2000), I argue that voter risk aversion towards 
uncertainty gives incumbents an advantage over challengers. The uncertainty driven 
advantage allows incumbents to diverge from the median voter in pursuit of legislative or 
ideological shirking without losing elections. These ideas suggest that incumbents would 
shirk more the greater is the incumbency advantage over challengers. This reasoning also 
implies that more incumbents who previously found it optimal to shirk more and lose their 
office would now be able to maintain their preferred level of shirking and stay in office. 
Therefore, a direct positive relationship should exist between reelection of incumbents and 
legislative shirking. In order to test this positive relationship empirically, it is sufficient to 
examine how the ideological distance between incumbents in the opposing political parties 
would change, thereby indicating a divergence from or convergence to the median voter. 
Hence, one can test the following hypothesis using a measure of political polarization or 
divergence derived from the ideology (D-NOMINATE) scores developed by Poole and 
Rosenthal (2001). 
 
Hypothesis: Ideological divergence (polarization) and incumbent reelection rate are 
positively related. 
 
This hypothesis should be tested using the 2SLS-IV estimator because the OLS 
estimator is likely to produce biased and inconsistent results in the presence of endogeneity 
bias.
2 The estimated equations using 2SLS-IV take on the following form in equations (1) 
and (2): 
 
reelected 1 5 4 3 2 1 0 ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = nt unemployme bills turnout swing ing redistrict        (1) 
ideology 2 10 9 8 7 6 ε β β β β β + + + + + =
∧
nt unemployme bills turnout reelected .              (2) 
 
Where  ideology is a measure of ideological divergence or polarization, reelected is the 
incumbent reelection rate, redistricting is the dummy variable controlling for years when 
redistricting occurred, turnout is the voter turnout rate, bills is the average number of 
introduced bills per congressman, swing is the percentage of seats that changed party, and 
                                                 
2 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test shown in Table 2 suggests that reelected is endogenous, which 
necessitates the use of 2SLS-IV estimator. The Hansen J over-identification of instruments test shown in Table 2 
suggests that bills and swing are “good” instruments. Good instruments are those instruments that are correlated 
with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error term.  
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unemployment is the unemployment rate. Ideological divergence or polarization is measured 
as the difference between Republican and absolute value of Democrat aggregate ideological 
(D-NOMINATE) scores for the House party coalitions developed by Poole and Rosenthal 
(2001). The ideological scores can range from -0.5 to 0.5. The negative range is arbitrarily 
assigned to liberal ideology and positive range to conservative ideology. Please refer to Table 
1 for variable description and sources.  
As the data availability has improved over time, it has become possible to collect just 
enough aggregate level data for an empirical investigation of ideological shirking. To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first attempt of using aggregate level data in examining this 
issue. My regression sample spans from 1948 to 2000 in two year intervals and amounts to 27 
observations. Data availability limits the amount of control variables and instruments that 
could be used without seriously depleting the degrees of freedom and weakening the power 
of statistical tests. The key variable of interest here is reelected. It represents the apparent re-
election success of incumbents (84% on average during 1948-2000) or the incumbency 
advantage, which is hypothesized to be positively related to ideological divergence or 
polarization. By reverse logic, reelected also reflects lower challenger quality that allows 
incumbents to be more successful.  
Instrumental variables such as swing and redistricting are included in the regression 
equation because they appear to be good instruments as confirmed by the Hansen J statistic 
shown in Table 2.
 The swing variable is intended to capture exogenous shifts in the political 
preferences of the voting population. For example, the 2006 U.S. Congressional elections 
resulted in many Democratic challengers replacing Republican incumbents, presumably for 
their handling of the Iraq war. This event would be reflected in a higher value of swing that 
should be negatively related to incumbent reelection rate. The redistricting variable is 
included to control for how political gerrymandering affects the incumbent reelection rate. 
The sign of redistricting is expected to be negative since the majority party in charge could 
use this tool to gain even more Congressional seats by defeating their toughest opponents (the 
other party’s incumbents) resulting in a lower incumbent reelection or higher turnover rate. 
The rationale for including voter turnout is due to Downs’ (1957) rational voter model that 
postulates that voters have more incentives to participate in a given election when they 
observe significant differences between competing candidates. Thus, one should expect a 
negative relationship between ideological divergence and voter turnout. Unemployment rate 
is included in the regression because economic performance has been found to be an 
important determinant of voting as it relates to political market efficiency (Peltzman, 1990). I 
hypothesize that unemployment should be negatively related to both incumbents’ reelection 
success and to ideological divergence. The average number of introduced bills per 
congressman is included to capture congressmen’s legislative productivity and how it relates 
to the ideological polarization. The average number of bills could reflect a participatory form 
of shirking found to be significant for departing incumbents in the U.S. House of 
Representatives (Rothenberg and Sanders, 2000). 
The 2SLS-IV regression results are shown in Table 2. A number of interesting and 
statistically significant relationships become apparent. In the first stage regression, swing is a 
significant instrument for the reelected variable suggesting that exogenous changes or shifts 
in the ideological preferences of voters have the expected negative effect on incumbent 
reelection rate. Redistricting can also be used by one party against the other in order to 
eliminate the toughest competitors—incumbents. Reinforcing this intuitive explanation is the 
negative and statistically significant relationship between reelected and redistricting in the 
first stage of the regression. Most importantly, the incumbent reelection rate is found to be 
positively and significantly related to ideological divergence or polarization in the second 
stage regression. The average number of bills introduced per congressman is also found to be 
negatively and significantly related to ideological divergence. These results suggest the  
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existence of participatory shirking that increases with ideological shirking—a result also 
found by Rothenberg and Sanders (2000).
3 However, neither voter turnout nor unemployment 
rate appears statistically significant in the second stage of the 2SLS-IV regression, although 
both have the expected negative signs. Moreover, additional regressions results shown in 
Table 2 are obtained using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique, 
which has a number of advantages over the least squares estimation technique.
4 The IV-
GMM regression results in Table 2 support the estimates from the first 2SLS-IV regression 
and also yield higher statistical significance for voter turnout and unemployment rate. 
Interestingly, voter turnout is negatively and significantly related to ideological divergence in 
the IV-GMM regression. This evidence suggests that ideological divergence decreases as 
voter participation increases, which is consistent with Downs’ (1957) rational voter model’s 
prediction. The first and second stage regressions shown in Table 2 are overall statistically 
significant and explain between 60 and 70 percent of variation in ideological divergence. 
In order to compare and contrast the IV estimates to what would be obtained using the 
biased and inconsistent OLS estimator, I present two OLS regressions in Table 3 that do not 
treat reelected as endogenous variable. The first OLS regression that does not include the two 
instruments for reelected yields a positive coefficient estimate for incumbent reelection rate 
that is similar to those obtained in the IV regressions. However, the second OLS regression 
that includes the two instruments along with the other regressors yields a negative coefficient 
estimate for reelected. None of these two coefficient estimates are statistically significant 
though. As confirmed by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, the biased and 
inconsistent OLS estimator performs worse than the 2SLS-IV estimator even if one 
independent variable is endogenous. Thus, the regression estimates obtained in this paper 
appear to support the proposed hypothesis that a rise in the incumbent reelection rate leads to 
more self-serving ideological legislation that departs from the median voter.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper examines the implications of the incumbency advantage for the principal-agent 
problem in the political market. It is argued that the incumbency advantage can emerge as a 
result of voter risk aversion towards uncertainty. This incumbency advantage can, in turn, be 
spent on ideological voting or shirking by incumbents. The empirical testing of this 
hypothesis using aggregate level data for the U.S. House of Representatives produces 
evidence pertinent to the overall efficiency of the political market. The efficiency of the 
political market is not automatically validated by the existence of political competitors 
(challengers) and requires a more rigorous investigation. As Mulligan and Tsui (2006) 
discover, the number of competitors is not necessarily a good indicator of public sector 
competitiveness and, therefore, efficiency. 
The empirical findings in this paper reveal that a rise in the incumbency advantage 
manifested in higher reelection rates leads to a greater ideological divergence or polarization 
in the U.S. House of Representatives. This ideological divergence away from the median 
voter could be interpreted as the evidence of ideological voting or legislative shirking on 
behalf of incumbents. If this is so, then this evidence suggests that the political market for the 
U.S. House of Representatives is not very effective in preventing ideological voting by 
incumbents. It is also found that the number of bills introduced per congressmen falls with 
                                                 
3 A finding of non-ideological or participatory shirking is consistent with the other findings in the literature 
showing that shirking may take the form of lower attendance rates and less frequent voting, especially for last-
term legislators (Lott, 1987, 1990; Parker and Powers, 2002). 
4 For robust estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and outliers Yaffee (2003) 
recommends using generalized method of moments (GMM). GMM is often applied to models when the 
explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous even after controlling for an unobserved effect, according to 
Wooldridge (2001).  
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greater ideological polarization. This evidence suggests that some non-ideological shirking 
takes place as well—good news for those who believe that the best government is the one that 
does least (in terms of introduced bills). Moreover, ideological shirking may not be “bad” if 
Caplan (2007) is right in arguing that voter errors are systematically biased against sound 
economic policy. In other words, a less than perfect adherence to the median voter’s 
preference might be preferred if democracy, according to H. L. Mencken, “is a pathetic belief 




Variable Description and Sources 
Variable Name (source)  Description  Mean 
(st. dev.)
Ideological divergence (1) 
Ideological divergence = (Republican ideology 




Democrat ideology index (1) 
Aggregate ideological index (D-NOMINATE) 
for the Democratic party coalition developed by 
Poole and Rosenthal (2001). 
-0.28 
(0.05) 
Republican ideology index 
(1) 
Aggregate ideological index (D-NOMINATE) 
for the Republican party coalition developed by 
Poole and Rosenthal (2001). 
0.32 
(0.08) 
Percent of incumbents 
reelected (1) 
Percentage of incumbents reelected that were 
seeking reelection in an election year. 
84.43    
(4.93) 
Redistricting dummy
 (1)  Takes on 1 if redistricting occurred in a given 
year or 0 otherwise. 
0.19 
(0.40) 
Percent of seats that 
changed party (1) 
Percentage of seats in Congress that changed 
party affiliation in a given year. 
4.77 
(4.52) 
Voter turnout (1)  Percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in 
a given election year. 
45.25 
(7.83) 
Bills per congressman (1)  Average number of bills introduced per 
congressman in a given year. 
26.83 
(12.42) 
Unemployment rate (2)  Percentage of the civilian labor force that is not 
employed, but currently seeking work. 
5.63 
(1.50) 
1.  Ornstein, N., Mann, T. & Malbin, M. (2002). Vital Statistics on Congress. 2001-2002, AEI Press, 
Washington D.C.. 
2.  U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov.  
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TABLE 2 
Endogenous Specification of Determinants of Ideological Divergence (Polarization), U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1948-2000 
1
st Stage Regression. Dependent Variable: Percent of Incumbents Reelected. 
Estimation Method  2SLS-IV  IV-GMM 
Observations 27  27 
Redistricting dummy




Percent of seats that changed party




















F-statistic 10.82  10.82 
Overall P-value  0.0000  0.0000 
Centered R-squared  0.6778  0.6778 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, P-value  0.0395  0.0395 
Hansen J over-identification test, P-value  0.8513  0.8513 
Partial R-squared test of excluded instruments, P-value  0.0000  0.0000 
Shea partial R-squared  0.6639  0.6639 
2
st Stage Regression. Dependent Variable: Ideological Divergence. 




















F-statistic 13.22  13.36 
Overall P-value  0.0000  0.0000 
Centered R-squared  0.6624  0.6614 
Notes: Dependent variable: Ideological divergence = (Republican ideology index - |Democrat 
ideology index|). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** 
at 5%, and * at 10%. 
†Instruments used in the 1
st stage regression for the endogenous variable--percent 
incumbents reelected. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the exogeneity of percent incumbents 




Exogenous Specification of Determinants of Ideological Divergence (Polarization), U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1948-2000 
Dependent Variable: Percent of Incumbents Reelected. 
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS 
Observations 27  27 
















Redistricting dummy (redistricting) -  -0.0502 
(0.0370) 
Percent of seats that changed party (swing) -  -0.0097** 
(0.0047) 




F-statistic 14.25  10.12 
Overall P-value  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared 0.6873  0.7368 
Notes: Dependent variable: Ideological divergence = (Republican ideology index - |Democrat 
ideology index|). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** 
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